











Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/116465                            
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
New Theory Reconsidered: Reply to Scott Walden and Dominic McIver Lopes 
Diarmuid Costello
I am grateful to Scott Walden and Dominic McIver Lopes for their comments on 
“What’s So New about the ‘New’ Theory of Photography?’. Their responses come 
from opposite ends of the spectrum in recent philosophy of photography, and I shall 
reply to them in turn.  
Scott Walden, as will be apparent from his response, is what I call an 
“Orthodox” theorist of photography, albeit a non-sceptical one; so it is no surprise 
that he remains unconvinced by much of what I say New Theory has to offer. What 
types Walden as an Orthodox theorist is his commitment to a certain view of how 
photographs to come into being, together with the further view (not thematized here) 
that our second order beliefs about how such images come into being impact our first-
order beliefs about what we are seeing, when what we are seeing is a photograph.1 For 
Orthodox theorists, “resolute” or otherwise, this is what explains photographs’ 
epistemic advantage over handmade images.2 Walden himself refers to these second 
order beliefs as knowledge, but that implies the beliefs in question are both justified 
and true, whereas I take them to be (at best) justified, but nonetheless false.  
What types Walden as a “non-sceptical” Orthodox theorist is that he thinks 
these facts are consistent with photography being art. And I agree. Although it is not 
clear from he says here that Walden recognizes this. The reason is straightforward: 
one can, as Walden suggests, turn automaticity into an artistic virtue rather than vice. 
Indeed many art practices (and not only photographic ones) have done so: witness the 
1 Walden (2005, 263, 272). 
2 On the distinction between “resolute” and “irresolute” Orthodox theorists, Costello (2018a, 
121-130).  
fascination with the aleatory, mechanical or automatic in avant-garde art since Dada 
and Surrealism as a strategy intended to undercut an overblown conception of the 
artist as a self-present agent fully in control of all his or her artistic acts. Indeed, this 
cast of mind is one of the reasons a certain kind of artist turns to photography in the 
first place—so as to mine its automatism for the aleatory and anomic effects thereby 
made possible. An obvious example is the valorisation of the uninflected or deadpan 
photographic document by various Conceptual and proto-Conceptual artists from Ed 
Ruscha and Bernd and Hilla Becher onwards.  
I doubt, however, that these are the kinds of photography that Walden has in 
mind, so consider a case much closer to the issues addressed in my article. In “The 
Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency,” Lopes argued that the affordance of clear 
or revelatory seeing are two kinds of aesthetic interest we can take in a scene as it 
appears through a photograph that we cannot always take in the same scene seen 
directly.3 The former arises from photography’s capacity to isolate aspects of a scene 
difficult to focus on in day-to-day life, the latter from the ways in which photographic 
framing and the like can defamiliarize an everyday scene. Lopes associates both with 
a broadly “documentary aesthetic,” and both are consistent with Orthodoxy being 
true. Modernist images by Lázló Moholy-Nagy, Henri Cartier-Bresson and André 
Kertész exploiting a combination of dramatic framing, unusual points of view, and 
collapsed or truncated depth of field are good examples of the latter. Not only do such 
images exploit photography’s automaticity for artistic gain, they implicitly leverage 
the folk theory underpinning Orthodoxy to generate their aesthetic pay-off. For it is 
only if one assumes a certain understanding of photography in one’s audience that one 
3 Lopes (2003, 445). A similar line of thought recurs as “the first art” in Lopes (2016, 36-47). 
will be able to trade on their delight in the fact that—since this a photograph—it 
really must be possible for the world to look like this.  
So there is little dispute between us about this.4 The substantive issue between 
us concerns whether the underlying beliefs that Walden subscribes to concerning how 
photographs come into being are true. Here, or so it initially seems, we do disagree: I 
think the latter are false, and that they are false because they rely on an impoverished 
understanding of how photographs come into being. More specifically, they are false 
as a general account of how photographs as a kind of image come into being, even 
though they may be true of how many photographs in genres that are important to us 
(such as vernacular, documentary or press photographs) do come into being. The fact 
that the underlying folk theory takes what is true of the latter to be true of the whole is 
what renders it inadequate as a general understanding of photographic aetiology. Seen 
in this light, Orthodoxy in philosophy of photography, from André Bazin through to 
Kendall Walton, consists of a gradual philosophical refinement of these underlying 
intuitions, intuitions that can traced all the way back to photography’s pioneers.5
If New Theorists are right, Walden and the folk implicitly endorse the same 
mistaken theory about this. To my surprise, Walden seems willing to grant this claim. 
Thus he writes, while parodying New Theory’s focus on the “photographic event” as 
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of photographs as images available to visual 
appreciation:  
Such candidate items of knowledge might not be incorrect. After all, such 
things as automotive and telephonic events regularly take place. But 
4 All are automatic images that, in Walden’s terms, are “NonrepresentationalS” and generative 
of an aesthetic interest, if not an “aesthetic interestS.” That is, all elicit some kind of aesthetic 
interest, just not an aesthetic interest in Scruton’s sense, since it may not be clear precisely 
what thought about the scene is being conveyed.  
5 Costello (2018a, 121-130).
merely highlighting properties instantiated by technologies being studied is 
not sufficient to foster understanding of those technologies. Instead, such 
understanding requires the highlighting of instantiated properties that 
either help users to interact with those technologies or designers to 
augment or improve those interactions. The properties highlighted by the 
new theorists in relation to photography are as inert in these respects as the 
ones imagined highlighted in relation to cars and telephones.6
Either Walden thinks the fact that existing folk theory (which new theorists take to be 
the basis of Orthodoxy in the philosophy of photography) is wrong does not matter, or 
he thinks that if it does matter it only matters to wrong people. If I have this right, I do 
not know what to make of it: if philosophers are not in the business of correcting false 
beliefs, what business are they in? Walden seems willing to grant that the beliefs in 
question are wrong, only to respond not in terms of philosophical debates, but in 
terms of engineers (those who have a detailed technical understanding of how a given 
technology works) or practitioners (those who only need to know how to use the 
technology in question). But besides being an odd demand to make of philosophers—
why should what philosophers do be of service to either camera engineers or camera 
operators?—this smacks of moving the goalposts. For the debate at issue concerns not 
how to help engineers or snappers, but what competing camps of philosophers believe 
is sufficient for a photograph to come into being. And this matters—which is to say 
that it matters philosophically—because if we get this wrong it pushes much of what 
photographers do in harnessing photographic technologies for artistic ends beyond the 
domain of photography proper. That should worry both theorists of photography and 
philosophers of art alike. 
6 Walden, (2019, MS, 4; my italics) 
In a certain mood, I am inclined to agree with Walden that calling what 
follows from taking such considerations seriously a “New Theory” or “paradigm 
shift” may be guilty of over-egging the pudding. For it can seem that recalling our 
attention to the fact that photography requires harnessing the capacity of light to mark 
sensitive surfaces, yet cannot be reduced to natural causality (because additional 
imaging processes are required to make the results available to visual appreciation) is 
little more than a reminder of what we (should) already know. But it bears noting just 
how widespread the relevant, and if New Theory is right, mistaken assumptions are. 
They arguably recur at several points in Walden’s response, notably when 
querying the need for New Theory as a response to Scruton’s scepticism. Take the 
(terrifying!) painting by Normal Rockwell resembling one of Walker Evans’s 1936 
photographs of starving Alabama sharecroppers that Walden asks us to imagine. This 
is an intuition pump that presumes the truth of Orthodoxy: that it succeeds is to be 
expected if the latter really is just a formalization of the intuitions underwriting folk 
theory of photography. But given that New Theorists dispute that painting represents 
a bona fide, non-contentious contrast class to photography, this cannot be assumed 
without begging the question. 
It is worth pausing to consider why New Theory arises from responding to 
Scruton in particular. Scruton’s scepticism crystallizes a powerful pattern of thought 
that permeates even non-sceptical, everyday thinking about photography. Just how 
standard is easily overlooked, but a continuous line can in fact be traced from Scruton 
back to 19th Century. Take the debate between Robert Demachy and Frederic Evans 
over the competing merits of the painterly Gum bichromate process versus and the 
Straight print, or the tussle between Henry Peach Robinson and Peter Henry Emerson 
over the respective merits of Pictorialism and Naturalism. At stake in both is whether 
straight (unaltered, non-combinatory) prints from straight negatives permit sufficient 
judgement and control to be art. Essentially the same divide was apparent, within two 
decades of photography’s invention, in the competing responses of Elisabeth Eastlake 
and Oliver Wendell Holmes to photography’s treatment of detail. Where the former 
chastised photography for its mindless lack of selectivity, attributable to the absence 
of human mediation and transformation, the latter celebrated the beauty that results 
from according equal attention to the marginal and seemingly unimportant.7 The 
fault-line throughout such debates is whether “pure” photography—photography in 
which the formation of the image bypasses the mental states of the artist—could be 
art, or whether photographers must choose between sacrificing photographic purity in 
order to make art, or give up their pretensions to making art as a cost of maintaining 
their photographic purity. Taking this longer view, there is little in Scruton, or many 
of his critics, that is not already present in Eastlake and Holmes circa 1857-9. Scruton 
merely reheats the sceptical side of the debate, and he can do so because the intuitions 
on which the debate turns remain common. Lopes recognizes this, and The Four Arts 
of Photography sets out to demonstrate the falsity of every premise in what he calls 
the “the sceptical argument.”  
My own view—and this is where I depart from Lopes—is that this focus is 
mistaken, and may represent New Theory’s Achilles Heel to date.8 Mistaken, that is, 
not in the sense of being wrong, so much as being misdirected. My own view is that 
New Theorists ought to take Walton rather than Scruton as their stalking horse, and 
for two reasons: not only is Walton’s conception of photography immeasurably richer 
than Scruton’s, it also speaks to both its epistemic and its aesthetic capacities. This is 
7 Costello (2018a, 10-24) 
8 Costello, (2018a, chapters 2-3) 
what makes Walton a representative of “Non-Sceptical” Orthodoxy on my taxonomy: 
his theory accounts for the epistemic privilege dear to Orthodox thinkers, but it does 
so in a way that does not rule out its artistic significance. For Walton, as is routinely 
overlooked in the rush to contest the counter-intuitiveness of the transparency thesis, 
photographs are not simply transparent; they are also pictures. That they are enables 
them to function as spurs to the kinds of imaginative capacities and projects in which 
Walton grounds the significance of pictures in general, thereby securing their 
aesthetic significance. While, unlike pictures in general, the fact that photographs are 
also transparent allows them to function as a significant means of learning about the 
world, thereby securing their epistemic significance. Because it accommodates both, I 
have argued that is Walton’s theory rather than Scruton’s that New Theorists should 
be cutting their teeth on.  
Be that as it may, New Theory does, as a matter of historical fact, emerge 
from taking up Scruton’s challenge that photography cannot be representational in his 
demanding sense. Walden is right to question Scruton’s easy conflation of artistic and 
aesthetic, indeed I think he might go much further. For the point can be made more 
broadly than the obligatory nod towards Conceptual Art. There is art not only after, 
but also before and, indeed, alongside, the aesthetic tradition. That is, there is art that 
predates a contemplative understanding of art (art in the service of magic and ritual, 
or propitiating the gods). There is also a rich variety of artistic practices outside the 
Western cannon that we treat aesthetically but that do not so function in their original 
cultures (West African masks being one obvious example). Finally, there is not only 
Conceptual art, but a wide variety of avant-garde, political, and “socially engaged” 
practices that aspire to provoke their viewers to action rather than contemplation. 
Then there is Scruton’s idiosyncratic, yet oddly uncontested, conception of what it is
to take an “aesthetic interest” in a work of art. It is much more common to understand 
aesthetics as picking out a distinctive feeling than as recuperating the “complete and 
manifest” expression of a thought. Indeed that it is, is one reason questions about the 
adequacy of aesthetics to art as a product of human action (hence made for reasons) 
routinely arise.  
If, instead of contesting this underlying picture, one concedes—as Walden 
proposes—that Representational Art of the kind Scruton has in mind cannot be 
produced photographically, in order to focus on the many other kinds of art (drawing 
on other kinds of aesthetic interest) that can, Scruton is entitled to shrug his shoulders. 
For this is a response that entirely passes Scruton’s argument by. So, while Walden 
and I may agree that the photographer can use automaticity in the service of their art, 
without producing works that are Representational in Scruton’s sense, we disagree as 
to the significance of this fact. Walden is undoubtedly right that this does not matter 
artistically—artists are free to make art however they want—but, philosophically, this 
response leaves Scruton completely untroubled.  
As to the second condition that Walden claims New Theory must meet in 
order to show that deflationary responses to Scruton fall short, but which it fails to 
meet: automaticity (or in Scruton’s version of Orthodoxy, non-agential causality) is 
indeed the only quality that is “strongly associated” (as Walden puts it), with ideal 
photographs. For Scruton, this is true by definition: ideal photographs are defined as 
being transparent to their objects, rather than their creator’s intentions, because they 
have a strictly causal relation to those objects. Neither I, nor Walden, may agree with 
this, but neither I, nor Walden, may wish it away. And this is why the considerations 
Walden raises against New Theory seem to me beside the point. The philosophical 
debate concerns what constitutes a satisfactory theory of photography. I doubt that 
either designers of cameras or software algorithms, or their end users, are given to 
fretting over photography’s alleged “fictional incompetence.” This is a philosophical 
worry, and it only arises given a certain conception of photography’s nature. This is 
what New Theorists are taking issue with, and to my mind it is enough. Walden may 
believe I think otherwise because I raise the question of to whom, according to New 
Theory, we should attribute the images on the 6600 rolls of film Garry Winogrand left 
either un-proofed or unprocessed on untimely his death in 1984. But I raise this, pace
Walden, not as a proof of New Theory’s practical value, but as a challenge to its lack 
of theoretical specificity to date as to how we should individuate photographs, once 
photographs are said to originate in photographic events. This matters, theoretically, 
should it turn out (and it does) that many photographs are the product of more than 
one. Perhaps Walden thinks this is not to matter enough. If so that would be another 
difference between us. 
All that being said, I recognize the force of Walden’s closing consideration: 
we do feel and respond differently to certain photographs (notably of loved ones and 
places we are familiar with) to the way we feel about many paintings. That said, there 
is often a failure to compare like with like in such cases, so it is worth asking what is 
doing the heavy lifting here—the medium of representation itself or familiarity and 
memory. However one comes out on that, explaining this need not involve attributing 
anything so arcane as quasi-philosophical views about automaticity to the folk. It need 
only involve some sense, however inchoate, that the way in which the photographs to 
which most people are routinely exposed (previously on “instamatic cameras” now on 
phones) come into being, by instantaneously recording their sources without obvious 
labour or skill, significantly differs to the way in which most handmade images come 
into being. Indeed, this may even be for the kinds of reasons that Walden has drawn 
attention to elsewhere.9 And such a sense, acquired in this way, may be grounded in 
beliefs that are reasonable, yet nonetheless misleading when generalized.    
My response to Lopes will be briefer, in part because there is less distance 
between us. Lopes and I are fellow travellers in these debates, even if I have taken 
issue with the “permissiveness” of his own version of the New Theory elsewhere.10
Lopes’s reply consists in part of providing a more explicit argument for New Theory 
intended to demonstrate its superiority over its competitors, of the sort I claim above 
has been lacking to date but, perhaps more interestingly, he does so by making clear 
some of the underlying methodological assumptions structuring his own approach to 
these questions. The latter clarifications are particularly welcome.  
As Lopes maintains in The Four Arts of Photography, Lyric photography 
presents the stiffest challenge to the Orthodox assumptions underpinning the sceptic’s 
argument, because only Lyric photography is incompatible with Orthodoxy being 
true. What Lopes calls “Lyric” photography encompasses a wide variety of practices 
that foreground the material processes and procedures of photography itself and, in so 
doing, take issue with Orthodoxy’s primary assumption by standing up to (P): “a 
photograph is an image that depicts by belief-independent feature tracking.” 11 This is 
Lopes’s way of styling the mind-independence or natural counterfactual dependency 
9 Walden (2005, 271-2). 
10 Costello (2016, 135-146) and Costello (2018b). 
11 These include Richard Mosse’s sumptuous hot pink images of warn torn Congo, made by 
exploiting the effects of the visible spectrum on infra-red film, Thomas Ruff’s coy blow-ups 
of low resolution pornographic screen-grabs, and Craigie Horsfield’s meditative, almost slow 
motion images of crowds, circuses, and zoo animals output as enormous tapestries on state of 
the art digitally programmed Jacquard looms. More controversially, they also include Gerhard 
Richter’s photo-paintings, on the assumption that these are both paintings and photographs, or 
photographs “completed by” painting.  
claim that is Orthodoxy’s bedrock. There are other forms of photographic art, but 
these are compatible with the latter being true; only Lyric photography tackles 
Orthodoxy head-on. There is a question-begging way of refusing this challenge; it is 
to reason:  
P is not naturally counterfactually dependent on its source,  
But natural counterfactual dependency on its source is a necessary condition 
of being a photograph,  
Therefore P cannot be a photograph.  
This response is question-begging because the major premise assumes the 
truth of Orthodoxy when its truth is precisely what is in question. It is nonetheless 
tempting because it appeals to widespread intuitions about the nature of photography. 
Because Lopes takes such appeals to be deeply, if unwittingly, theory laden—per my 
response to Walden—his own work studiously avoids such appeals in favour of what 
he calls “second-order” methodology. Lopes proposes we think of this on the model 
of philosophy of science. The empirical sciences provide a well-researched body of 
data about the natural world. The philosopher of science’s task is not to model the 
natural world directly—this is best left to scientists; it is to make theoretical sense of 
the first order explanations and hypotheses of empirical science. By analogy, the task 
of the philosopher of art is not to engage directly with artistic cases—leave that to 
appropriately trained critics and historians; it is to take the deliverances of first order 
art criticism and theorizing as primary data for philosophizing. On this model, the 
philosophy of art asks not “What is Art (or Photography)?” but, rather, “What must 
Art (or Photography) be, given how it is treated in the relevant first order sciences?”12
12 On this, as well as being unmoved by appeals to intuition, Lopes is close to Kendall 
Walton’s methodological observations in Walton (2007)  
As he puts it elsewhere, Lopes’s recommendation is to “go social.”13 So understood, 
photography is at bottom a technology for making images by outputting information 
recorded from a momentary state of a light image; it only becomes a medium of 
artistic expression by being subject to the evaluative norms that constitute the arts as 
appreciative practices. This is because the arts are one kind of social practice, a kind 
that it constituted by norms of an appreciation nature. 
Consistent with this understanding of methodology, Four Arts examines a 
range of photographic arts as appreciative (social) practices. In doing so it takes the 
writings of art critics, historians and theorists as the primary input for theorizing and 
outputs philosophical theories consistent that input, subject to whatever fine-tuning 
(elimination of redundancy or contradiction, streamlining, perspicuous presentation, 
and the like) elegant theorizing requires. Or so Lopes claims. But one might wonder 
whether this presentation of what he is up to properly reflects his direction of travel. 
Recall that Four Arts begins by isolating a powerful pattern of thinking that naturally 
engenders scepticism about photography’s standing as art. Lopes formalizes such 
thinking, and identifies the four arts of his title with different forms of photographic 
art that “stand up” to each of its premises in turn. This set up, as I have acknowledged 
elsewhere, is both bracing and elegant.14 The question I want to raise here, in light of 
Lopes’s methodological clarifications, is whether it adequately reflects his preferred 
method. The sceptical argument, so formalized, is something that only a philosopher 
could have come up with. This is not to deny that it may well reflect a widespread, if 
largely implicit and inchoate folk theory about photography, but rather to note that its 
formalization is allowed to determine how the first order, critical and historical, field 
13 Lopes (2018a)  
14 Costello (2016, 136). 
is conceived. This requires carving the artistic world at joints quite different to those 
served up by the relevant first order sciences themselves.  
As a result, it is questionable whether Lopes’s conceptualization of the field 
would be recognizable to leading art historians, critics and theorists as a philosophical 
theorisation of their own, first order, results. On Lopes’s way of carving the terrain, 
for example, historian-critics of traditions as profoundly opposed to one another as 
Douglas Crimp and Michael Fried turn out to be charting the vicissitudes of a single 
art. This despite the fact that Crimp and Fried understand their respective canons as 
directly opposed: Sherrie Levine, Louise Lawlor, and Barbara Kruger as exemplars of 
postmodern anti-authorial appropriation on the one side; Jeff Wall, Andreas Gursky 
and Thomas Struth as exemplars of the Tableaux form’s inheritance of modernist 
painting on the other. In so far as the two canons share any artists in common—I am 
thinking of James Welling and Cindy Sherman—this relies on making diametrically 
opposed claims for what they are up to, so that they can be recruited to competing sets 
of critical values. So here we have critics with directly opposed values, one dedicated 
to debunking such “modernist myths” as authorship, expression, aesthetic value and 
the like, the other to celebrating these very values, and doing so through what they 
take to be diametrically opposed canons—if the results of first order empirical science 
are to be believed—being presented as a single art.  
It is hard to know what to do with this. Either my own representation of the 
relevant first order science is misleading (and I am confident that it is not) or Lopes’s 
is. Suppose for the sake of argument that I am right: if Lopes is justified in presenting 
the field as he does, this notwithstanding, he would either need to show that the first 
order science is mistaken, by providing some kind of error theory, or to provide some 
other grounds to justify rewriting it. But doing either would appear to flout his stated 
aim of making theoretical sense of the deliverances of first order science. And this is 
not an isolated example: all of the arts of photography, as they fall out of the sceptic’s 
argument, comprise a wide variety of contrasting, and often tenuously related artistic 
practices. Suffice to say here that, on Lopes’s way of parsing the terrain, there will be 
as many, if not more, similarities between practitioners of distinct arts as there will be 
between practitioners of what is supposed to be same art. Once that is true, Lopes’s 
claim that the “four arts” present a philosophical theorisation of first order science, 
supported by the work of critics and historians, may prove difficult to sustain.15 If 
nothing else, this shows that what it is to take first order research as data for second 
order philosophizing may be less straightforward than Lopes’s recommendation to 
“go social” suggests, especially when first order practice is itself conflicted, as it so 
often is. In such circumstances it may become unavoidable for second order practice 
to take a stance on some matter of controversy within first order debate, thereby 
collapsing the methodological distance between them.   
As Lopes remarks whilst explaining his own reservations about first order 
approaches in aesthetics, “there is reason to doubt that philosophers’ judgements 
about cases provide good materials for conceptual analysis.”16 And I agree. But my 
question is: what prevents the worry recurring at the next level up? If philosophers do 
not generally have the critical sensitivity to dispense with the intermediate results of 
art critics and historians, in order to engage with the first order field directly, why 
assume they have the critical sensitivity to be attentive readers of what these same 
critics and historians produce? In itself this need not be a problem—there are good 
15 Costello (2016, 138-9). 
16 Lopes ( 2018b, 35).  
reasons for disciplinary differences after all—but it may become one given Lopes’s 
presentation of his own method.  
Setting this to one side, the question between us is whether New Theory’s 
explanation of the much-vaunted epistemic privilege of (some) photography bests 
Orthodoxy’s. According to the latter, photography’s epistemic privilege is a direct 
entailment of how it is defined, with all the adverse consequences for understanding 
photography as art that this brings in train. Per my response to Walden, Lopes is right 
that I think this the decisive test for New Theory. Given the variety, depth and social 
importance of photography’s epistemic uses, it would be a Pyrrhic victory to secure 
its artistic standing at the cost of rendering the form mysterious. On Lopes’s model, 
the arts of photography are distinguished from photography as a technical process for 
making images by their responsiveness to social norms. Because the norms in 
question are appreciative, the arts are appreciative practices. Consistent with this 
explanation of what makes the arts of photography appreciative practices, uses of 
photography that subtend quite different social practices will be responsive to quite 
different norms. When, as in a variety of forensic, diagnostic, scientific or legal 
contexts, photography is tasked with providing reliable knowledge of the world, the 
norms in question will be largely epistemic (reliability, accuracy, clarity, lack of 
ambiguity or propensity to mislead, and so on). But this is a fact about the social 
practices that such uses of photography serve; it is not a fact about photography per 
se—as can be seen from the very different norms that govern the appreciation of 
abstract photography, to pick just one example. 
This is a compelling set of claims. The fact that the authority of such norms 
has to be policed with the threat of serious professional sanction if flouted out in field 
(where channel conditions cannot be carefully monitored, as they can in lab by highly 
skilled technicians) shows as well as anything might that nothing internal to the nature 
of photographic technology prevents their being flouted. Indeed they very often are. 
Denying these claims would also require stipulating that a variety of art institutions, 
including those dedicated to the criticism, collecting and curating of photography are 
hopelessly confused, given that much of what they spend their time and resources on 
does not count as photography strictly speaking. From where would philosophers’ 
authority to so stipulate derive?  
In a recent symposium about the New Theory, Catharine Abell encouraged 
Lopes to pursue the implications of the proposed social turn to its terminus. Abell’s 
contention is that New Theory chez Lopes should dispense with reference to belief-
independent feature tracking altogether, even for epistemic uses of photography, in 
favour of a theory that leaves the preservation of photography’s epistemic values to 
the institutions that photography serves, and understands photography itself in terms 
of conveying information from a recording event. How strictly a given institution 
need police the preservation of such information would no longer turn on anything 
taken to be intrinsic to the nature of photography—including the capacity to track 
features independently of belief—but on the functions of the institution in question. 
That belief independent feature tracking can fall away, without thereby undermining 
an image’s epistemic value, may be seen from the assignment of arbitrary colour 
values to different kinds of tissue or gas in certain forms of diagnostic, medical and 
astrological photography to aid extraction of the sought after information. Because in 
these contexts channel conditions can be closely monitored, failing to track features 
independently of belief can often aid extraction of the target information, hence need 
not compromise an image’s epistemic standing. On Abell’s proposed reformulation: 
“all photographs carry information about the photographic events causally involved in 
their production and thus about the pro-photographic scenes information about which 
those events record. This is a fact about them quite independent of the social norms 
that govern them.”17 So understood, what makes one kind of photography more 
epistemically valuable than another is neither whether it tracks features independently 
of belief, nor solely whether it is subject to the norms of a knowledge-oriented social 
practice, but whether it carries information in an easy to extract form, via a channel 
recognized as effective for the purpose. If Lopes concurs, the challenge now facing 
New Theory will be to specify, in a non-arbitrary way, how effective such a channel 
must be to form part of photographic process. I suspect that Lopes’s miminalism on 
this question to date: “[t]echnically, if there is some modicum of information transfer, 
we have a photograph” is unlikely to satisfy Orthodox defenders of photography’s 
epistemic value.18 Whether that is genuine cause for concern I leave others to decide. 
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